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Daniel Hemelt
Should federal securities laws apply to overseas transactions involving
shares that are cross-listed on US. exchanges? This Comment approaches that
question from two directions: Supreme Court doctrine and modern finance
theory. As a doctrinal matter, this Comment argues that under the Supreme
Court's 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the answer
is yes: federal securities laws should apply to all transactions involving shares
that are listed for trading on US. exchanges, including transactions that occur
overseas. From a finance theory perspective, this Comment explains how
allowing foreign firms to "opt in" to US. securities laws through cross-listing
can create an environment in which issuers choose the legal regime that
minimizes their capital-raising costs. The Morrison majority opinion, if
faithfully followed, could mark a step toward a system of "issuer choice." Yet,
federal district courts have strayed from the text of the Morrison majority's
holding in ways that may reduce the efficiency of capital markets.
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Introduction
In June 2010, the Supreme Court handed down a sweeping ruling in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.' that dramatically limited the
geographic reach of U.S. securities fraud laws. The issue in the case was
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1. 130 S. Ct. 2869.
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whether investors who purchased shares of National Australia Bank ("NAB")
on a Sydney stock exchange could proceed with a lawsuit against the bank and
several of its former employees alleging that the defendants had made
"deceptive" statements in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.2
In a long list of decisions dating back to the 1960s, federal courts had allowed
foreign investors to pursue § 10(b) claims arising out of transactions that
occurred on non-U.S. exchanges. 3 But in Morrison, Justice Scalia, along with
four other Justices, reversed more than four decades of lower-court cases and
announced a new "transactional test"4 to determine the geographic scope of
§ 10(b). This transactional test asks "whether the purchase or sale [1] is made
in the United States, or [2] involves a security listed on a domestic exchange." 5
Only if the answer to at least one of these questions is "yes" does § 10(b) apply.
The holding in Morrison marked a departure from the "unpredictable" 6
outcomes in earlier cases, and at the time, it was hailed for its "clarity." 7 Even
Justice Stevens, who refused to join the Court's opinion, acknowledged that
"the clarity and simplicity of the Court's test may have some salutary
consequences." 8 With regard to the first part of the transactional test ("whether
purchase or sale is made in the United States"), this "clarity" may be
overstated. Indeed, as lower courts have noted, the Morrison majority "did not
. . . discuss what it means for a purchase or sale to be 'made in the United
States."' 9 But the second part of the transactional test ("whether the purchase or
sale ... involves a security listed on a domestic exchange") seems like it should
be relatively easy to apply. One can go to the websites of the American Stock
Exchange ("AMEX"), NASDAQ, and New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
and determine whether a firm's common stock is listed for trading on those
exchanges. Seventy-eight non-U.S. companies have common stock that is
2. Id. at 2875-76; cf Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)) (making it unlawfiul "[tlo use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe").
3. See, e.g., Gottfried v. Germain (In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig.), 578 F.3d 1306, 1307, 1313-
14 (1lth Cir. 2009); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968).
4. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
5. Id.
6. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, U.S. Securities Fraud Across the Border:
Unpredictable Jurisdiction, 55 BuS. LAW. 975 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., No. 08 Civ. 3758, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010) (praising the "clarity, simplicity, certainty and consistency" of the new
transactional test).
8. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
9. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., No. 08 Civ. 1958,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105720, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010); accord Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor
Co., No. CV 10-0922, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79837, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (lamenting that
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directly listed on AMEX,' 0 227 on NASDAQ," and 140 on the NYSE.12
Justice Scalia's use of the logical disjunctive "or" "whether the purchase or
sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic
exchange"l3 -would seem to suggest that transactions involving the common
stock of any of these 445 companies would fall within the scope of § 10(b),
regardless of whether "purchase or sale is made in the United States."l 4
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, however,
has rejected this straightforward reading of Morrison. In two separate decisions
handed down during the summer of 2010, Judge Vincent Marrero concluded
that § 10(b) does not apply to any transactions on a foreign market, regardless
of whether the securities at issue are listed for trading on a U.S. exchange.' 5
Judge Deborah Batts reaffirmed this conclusion in a January 2011 case
involving Royal Bank of Scotland securities." In a February 2011 opinion,
Judge Richard Holwell also acknowledged that his court's reading of Morrison
was "not . .. free from doubt,"' 7 but-like his colleagues-he concluded that
§ 10(b) does not apply to overseas transactions in securities that are cross-listed
on domestic and foreign exchanges.' 8 And in two additional cases, the Southern
District has dismissed § 10(b) claims by plaintiffs who purchased common
stock abroad when the same stock was directly listed and traded on a U.S.
exchange.19 Thus, the two parts of the transactional test ("whether the purchase
10. Listings Directory, NYSE AMEX, http://www.nyse.comabout/listed/c-altus-region.shtml
(go to the "Region" dropdown menu; select the "International" option) (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
11. NASDAQ International Companies, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/nonUSoutput.asp (follow the link for "Download non U.S. company list")
(last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
12. NYSE Listings Directory, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc-nyissuetype.html (click on "NYSE-Listed Non-U.S. Companies";
go to the "Issue Type" dropdown menu; select the "Common Stock" option) (last visited Nov. 27,
2010).
13. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886 (emphasis added).
14. See id.
15. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6595, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98242, at *18-
19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) ("[T]he transactions themselves must occur on a domestic exchange to
trigger application of § 10(b) . . . ."); Comwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (concluding that under Morrison, § 10(b) does "not extend to foreign securities trades
executed on foreign exchanges").
16. See In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 300, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3974, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2011) (citing In re Alstom approvingly); id. at *24, *26 (citing
Cornwell).
17. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 05571, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17514, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011).
18. Id.
19. See In re Celestica Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07 CV 312, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110630, at *2
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010) (stating that "this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of
purported class members who acquired Celestica common stock on foreign markets," even though
Celestica shares were directly listed and traded on NYSE as well as the Toronto Stock Exchange
("TSX")); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, No. 09 Civ. 10087, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79688, at *2, *69
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010) (concluding that Morrison precludes "the claims of any potential class
members who purchased Canadian Superior common stock on a foreign exchange," even though
Canadian Superior shares were directly listed and traded on AMEX as well as TSX).
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or sale [1] is made in the United States, or [2] involves a security listed on a
domestic exchange" 2) have collapsed into one. All that counts under the
Southern District's approach is where the transaction occurs. If the transaction
occurs abroad, it does not matter whether the security at issue is listed on a U.S.
exchange; according to the Southern District's rule, § 10(b) does not apply.
From a doctrinal perspective, the Southern District's conclusion is
suspect. The Morrison majority would not have incorporated the second prong
(listing on a domestic exchange) into the transactional test if the first prong
(location of the transaction) were always outcome-determinative.21 From a
policy perspective, the Southern District's conclusion is unfortunate. According
to a long literature in law and finance, one reason why foreign firms cross-list
their shares on U.S. exchanges is to "bond" themselves to the U.S. securities
regime and thus to compensate for weak investor protections in their home
22countries. Once a foreign firm bonds itself to U.S. securities laws, its shares-
including shares that trade on home-country markets-experience a dramatic
and well-documented rise.23 If Morrison is read to limit § 10(b) to domestic
transactions, then hundreds of foreign firms will become "unbound." This
result is bad for minority shareholders since they will lose the investor
protections afforded by the U.S. securities regime, and it is bad for foreign
firms since they will subsequently face higher capital-raising costs. If cross-
listing becomes less attractive to foreign firms, then the Southern District's
interpretation of Morrison will harm the U.S. financial services sector as well,
since cross-listing leads to underwriting fees for U.S. investment banks and
commission fees for U.S. stock brokers.2 5
20. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
21. Cf Irwin H. Warren & Margarita Platkov, Further Look at 'Morrison': A Plain Meaning
Analysis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 2010, at 4, available at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub-9985
("As Justice Scalia himself said: 'Every word that is not a help is a hindrance because it distracts."'
(quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 81 (2008))).
22. See infra text accompanying and sources cited in notes 37-48.
23. See infra text accompanying and sources cited in notes 40-52.
24. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listing and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1780 (2002)
(stating that when a foreign firm is subject to U.S. securities laws, "investors acquire the ability to
exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies, such as class actions and derivative actions, that are
simply not available in the firm's home jurisdiction").
25. See Daniel Gross, Adios, IPOs, SLATE (Aug. 2, 2006, 4:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2147063 ("Raise $100 million in the United States, and you pay the New York-
based bankers at Merrill Lynch or Goldman Sachs somewhere between $6.5 million and $7 million.");
see also OXERA CONSULTING LTD., THE COST OF RAISING CAPITAL: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2006), available at
http://www.nd.edu/-carecoblMay2008Conference/Papers/OxeraCostofcapitalreportExecSummary.pdf
(stating that "fees of 6.5-7% are most common" for initial public offerings on U.S. exchanges); cf
MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 9-10 (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/htmlom/pdf/ny report final.pdf (noting the importance of the financial services
sector to the U.S. economy in general, and to New York City in particular).
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The Southern District's decisions are especially significant because the
district is "the traditional stronghold of federal securities litigation." 2 6
Moreover, the Second Circuit's decision to affirm or reverse the Southern
District's decisions will have ramifications for all federal securities suits, as
"that Court of Appeals [is] regarded as the 'Mother Court' in this area of
law." 27 This Comment argues that the Second Circuit should overrule the
Southern District's doctrine on cross-listed securities: § 10(b) should apply to
any transaction involving a foreign firm's shares if those shares are listed for
trading on a U.S. exchange, and plaintiffs who purchase cross-listed securities
abroad ought to be able to recover in U.S. courts. If the Second Circuit (or the
Supreme Court 28) fails to address this issue, the SEC should recommend that
Congress rewrite the securities laws to allow foreign firms to bond themselves
through cross-listing.29 Foreign equity issuers should have the option of
subjecting all their common shares to § 10(b). The Southern District's decisions
deny foreign issuers this choice.
I. The Basics of Bonding
Foreign firms can access U.S. equity markets by issuing American
Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") in conjunction with a U.S. financial institution
or by directly listing their ordinary shares on a U.S. exchange. An ADR is a
dollar-denominated certificate backed by the stock of a foreign firm. A U.S.
bank keeps the foreign firm's stock in its vault, and an investor who holds an
ADR has the right to exchange the receipt for shares in the foreign firm. 30 The
26. See JOHN W. MOKA III, 2010 A RECORD YEAR FOR SECURITIES LITIGATION: AN ADVISEN
QUARTERLY REPORT-2010 REvIEw 4 (2011), available at
https://www.advisen.com/downloads/seclitQ42010_report.pdf (noting that the Southern District of
New York accounted for 10% of all federal securities lawsuits filed in the fourth quarter of 2010).
27. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); accord Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 762) (describing the Second Circuit as
"[t]he 'Mother Court' of securities law"); Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 420 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(same); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir. 1979)
(same); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 n.29 (3d Cir. 1977) (same).
28. One judge in the Southern District of New York has urged higher courts or the legislative
branch to resolve the lingering uncertainty regarding the meaning of Morrison. See In re Vivendi
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 05571,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17514, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2011) ("[R]esolution of these issues is fairly the province of the Supreme Court or Congress.").
29. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929Y, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871, the SEC must "conduct a study to determine the extent to
which private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
... should be extended to cover . . . securities transactions occur[ring] outside the United States" and
must submit recommendations to the House and Senate by January 2012. The SEC could use this study
as a vehicle to advocate for preserving the private right of action of investors who hold foreign shares of
cross-listed firms.
30. American Depositary Receipt, FIN. TIMES LEXICON,
http://exicon.ft.com/term.asp?t-American-Depositary-Receipt--ADR (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). "The
acronyms 'ADR' and 'ADS' are often used interchangeably," see Peter M. Friedman, Note, Risky
Business: Can Faulty Country Risk Factors in the Prospectuses of U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Raise
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investor can exercise that right upon paying a conversion fee. ' Some ADRs are
"unsponsored," which means that they were issued by a U.S. bank "in response
to market demand" but without the contractual consent of the foreign firm.32
Others are "sponsored," which means that they were created through a formal
arrangement between the foreign firm and the U.S. depositary bank. Issuers of
sponsored ADRs generally file a Form F-6 registering their ordinary shares
with the SEC,34 although these shares are registered "[n]ot for trading, but only
in connection with the registration of American Depositary Shares."35
Alternatively, foreign firms can bypass the ADR route and offer their common
stock for trading on AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. As mentioned above,
approximately 445 firms follow this latter capital-raising strategy.
Although the cross-listing of foreign securities on U.S. exchanges dates
back to the pre-World War I era,37 and ADRs existed even before the stock
market crash of 1929,38 foreign firms' equity-raising activities in the United
States have accelerated in recent years. Between 1990 and 2005, the number of
foreign firms that listed their ordinary shares or ADRs on U.S. exchanges
increased by 164%.39 These ADR sponsorships and cross-listings have
generated significant positive returns for shareholders in the United States and
Violations of U.S. Securities Law?, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 241, 245 n.15 (2005), but the two
terms differ in meaning. An ADR is the "actual physical certificate" stating that the holder owns a
certain number of American Depositary Shares ("ADSs"), see Depositary Receipt Services: FAQs,
CITIGROUP, http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/faq/faq.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2011), whereas an ADS is "the
actual unit traded on the basis of the ADR," see American Depositary Share, FIN. TIMES LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/term.asp?t-American-Depositary-Share--ADS (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). For
example, a foreign firm might deposit ten ordinary shares with a U.S. financial institution, and the
depositary institution might issue one ADS on the basis of those ten ordinary shares. An investor might
purchase ten ADSs but might use a single certificate (the ADR) to represent that investment. In this
example, the ADR holder (with one receipt representing ten ADSs) would have a stake in the foreign
firm equivalent to that of an investor who purchased 100 ordinary shares on a non-U.S. exchange.
31. See Melek Pulatkonak & George Sofianos, The Distribution of Global Trading in ATYSE-
Listed Non-U.S. Stocks 7 (N.Y. Stock Exch., Working Paper No. 99-03, 1999).
32. See DR Basics and Benefits, BANK OF N.Y. MELLON CORP.,
http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr-edubasics-and_ benefits.jsp (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
33. See id.
34. See SEC, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 for Depositary Shares
Evidenced by American Depositary Receipts (Form F-6) 2 (approved through Nov. 30, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formf-6.pdf.
35. See, e.g., AstraZeneca PLC, Annual Report (Form 20-F) I (Mar. 12, 2004). See generally
GEORGE T. CONWAY III, PRE-NATIONAL AUSTRALIA DISMISSALS INVOLVING ISSUERS WITH ADRs OR
GRSs (2010), available at http://bit.ly/coverpgs (reproducing SEC registration statements for defendant
firms in cases that were dismissed pre-Morrison).
36. See supra notes 10-12.
37. See Lance Davis, Larry Neal & Eugene White, How It All Began: The Rise of Listing
Requirements on the London, Berlin, Paris, and New York Stock Exchanges, 38 INT'L J. ACCT. 117, 129
(2003).
38. Amar Gande, American Depositary Receipts: Overview and Literature Survey, 6 FIN.
MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 61, 62-63 (1997).
39. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rend M. Stulz, Has New York Become Less
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abroad. By one estimate, foreign firms whose securities trade on U.S.
exchanges exhibit a valuation premium over non-cross-listed foreign firms of
approximately 37% (controlling for other factors, including the firm's book
value).40 Given that the mean book value of the firms in this sample is
approximately $47.3 billion,41 even a small percentage-point increase in
valuation as a result of cross-listing-multiplied across hundreds of cross-listed
firms-would suggest that the sum of shareholder value created by the cross-
listing phenomenon over the past two decades is at least in the eleven-digits, if
not higher.42
The most common explanation for the "cross-listing premium"43 is the
"bonding hypothesis."44 This hypothesis holds that "[i]ssuers migrate to U.S.
exchanges because by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the United States's
higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public
and private enforcers), they partially compensate for weak protection of
minority investors under their own jurisdictions' laws. . . ."45 In other words, a
40. Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rend M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the
U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 206 (2004).
41. Cf Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Ren6 M. Stulz, Why Do Foreign Firms Leave
U.S. Equity Markets, 65 J. FIN. 1507, 1519 tbl.1, 1550 tbl.A.I (2010) (reporting the mean value of cross-
listed firms' assets as $59.18 billion and the mean debt-to-asset ratio of cross-listed firms as 0.20, which
indicates that the book value of equity-for example, assets minus debt-is 0.80 x $59.1 billion = $47.3
billion).
42. The summary statistics on cross-listed firms refer to a sample of approximately 650
issuers. See id. at 1518. Multiplying the book value per firm of $47.3 billion by 650 firms yields $30.75
trillion. If cross-listing adds only one tenth of one percent to the value of these firms, then 0.001 x
$30.75 trillion = $30.75 billion. Thus, even extraordinarily conservative estimates for the size of the
cross-listing premium indicate that the dollar amounts at stake are massive.
43. Analyses of the "cross-listing premium" typically do not distinguish between, on the one
hand, ADRs, and, on the other hand, ordinary shares that are directly listed for trading on U.S.
exchanges. Before Morrison, the geographic reach of § 10(b) depended on "(1) an 'effects test,'
'whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States
citizens,' and (2) a 'conduct test,' 'whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States."'
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010) (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187,
192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)). Neither of these tests turned on the form in which a foreign firm's equity was
traded in the United States.
44. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling identify
"bonding costs" as expenditures by the owner or manager of a firm to guarantee to outside equity
investors that the owner/manager will not behave opportunistically with respect to minority or
noncontrolling stakeholders. See id. at 325. For a controlling shareholder who is raising equity from
minority investors, bonding may reduce capital costs because investors are willing to pay more for their
minority stakes (they are willing to accept a smaller return) if the controlling shareholder has taken steps
ex ante (before the sale of stock) that reduce her own incentives to behave opportunistically ex post
(after the sale). Section 10(b) can be seen as a "bonding cost" within the Jensen and Meckling
framework: a controlling shareholder may opt to expose herself to § 10(b) actions because by doing so,
she makes minority investors more confident that she will work to maximize cash flows for the firm.
45. See Coffee, supra note 24, at 1757; accord John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
641, 652, 674 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Future as History]; Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as
Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 675, 687
(2002); Rene M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Fall 1999, at 8, 16.
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controlling shareholder has less incentive to extract rents from minority
investors if opportunistic behavior exposes the controlling shareholder to legal
action in U.S. courts, and a controlling shareholder has less ability to extract
rents undetected if the firm is subject to SEC disclosure rules. Knowing this,
investors may be willing to pay more for minority stakes in cross-listed firms
than for otherwise-comparable stakes in firms that are only subject to foreign
investor protection and disclosure regimes. Assuming that a controlling
shareholder wants to raise as much equity capital as possible while selling as
small a percentage of her firm as possible, she may choose to cross-list in order
to maximize the price she receives for the shares that she sells.
Numerous empirical analyses have reached results consistent with this
hypothesis. For example, Doidge and his coauthors find that the effect of cross-
listing on share price is larger for firms from home countries whose investor
protection regimes are weakest. 4 6 This finding suggests that the marginal
benefits from increased investor protection are at least partially driving cross-
listing premiums: if cross-listing bumps up a firm's share price because it
increases the level of investor protection, then one would think that the bump
would be greater when the increase in investor protection is more dramatic. 47
Dyck and Zingales reach similar conclusions by measuring the size of the
controlling block premium for non-cross-listed and cross-listed foreign firms.48
The controlling block premium is the difference between the price-per-share
paid by investors who acquire a controlling stake in a firm and the price-per-
share paid by investors who acquire minority interests. When legal protections
for minority investors are weaker, the controlling block premium is expected to
be larger because the controlling shareholder has more opportunities to extract
rents from minority investors. 4 9 Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, Dyck
and Zingales find that cross-listing reduces block premiums (in other words,
cross-listing narrows the gap between the controlling stakeholder's price-per-
share and the minority investor's price-per-share).50 Moreover, this effect is
46. See Doidge et al., supra note 40, at 231 (finding that cross-listing premiums are larger for
foreign firms from countries with weak shareholder protections than for firms from countries with strong
shareholder protections); see also Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An
International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 565-66 (2004) (finding that cross-listing is associated with an
increase in the value of minority shares relative to controlling stakes); Paul M. Vaaler & Burkhard N.
Schrage, Legal System and Rule of Law Effects on US Cross-Listing To Bond by Emerging-Market
Firms 28-29 (Oct. 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/assets/151377.pdf ("[O]ur empirical results indicate that emerging-market
firms exhibit behavior consistent with the bonding hypothesis.").
47. William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65
(2002) (reaching results that are generally consistent with this finding); see id. at 102 ("[F]irms from
countries with weak shareholder protection appear to cross-list, among other reasons, for the purpose of
voluntarily bonding themselves to US securities and market regulations, allowing them to raise capital
more easily at home and elsewhere outside the US.").
48. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 46.
49. See id. at 538.
50. Id. at 557-58.
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most dramatic for cross-listing firms from home countries whose investor
protections are least stringent.5 1
The positive effect of cross-listing on share price is not limited to the
shares in the foreign firms that are traded on U.S. markets. The effect extends
to the cross-listing firms' shares on home-country exchanges as well.52 This
result suggests that shareholders in the United States and abroad value the
investor protections afforded by the U.S. securities regulatory regime.
At first, the robust empirical support for the bonding hypothesis may seem
surprising, since the SEC rarely brings enforcement actions against cross-listed
firms for violations of U.S. securities laws.53 But the SEC is not the only
enforcer of U.S. securities laws. For decades, courts have recognized that
investors may bring a private action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.54 Courts have extended this right to foreign as well as domestic
investors. 5 By one count, whereas the SEC initiated enforcement actions
against only thirteen cross-listed firms between January 1, 1995, and June 30,
2002, private plaintiffs brought at least seventy-five complaints against cross-
56
listed firms in the same period. Foreign firms that issue shares in the United
States are almost as likely as domestic issuers to be the target of a private
securities suit in federal court.57 Thus, to the extent that the cross-listing
premium arises from the "greater threat of enforcement" facing foreign firms
51. Id. at 565; see also id. ("These results provide direct support for the contention of Coffee
.... Reese and Weisbach .. . , and Doidge et al.. . . of a link between cross listing and private benefits."
(citing Coffee, Future as History, supra note 45; Doidge et al., supra note 40; and Reese & Weisbach,
supra note 47)). But see Amir N. Licht, Xi Li & Jordan I. Siegel, What Makes the Bonding Stick? A
Natural Experiment Involving the Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms 32 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 11-072, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1744905 (finding that cross-
listed firms experienced "significantly positive abnormal returns" immediately after the Morrison oral
argument and again after the June 2010 decision); id. ("These results challenge the legal bonding
hypothesis .... Quite to the contrary, the results support the notion that by severing the ties to the U.S.
civil liability regime, the Supreme Court did a beneficial service to U.S.-listed foreign firms. . . .").
52. See Craig Doidge, U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from
Dual-Class Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519, 527 (2004) (using "weekly home market closing data" to
demonstrate that cross-listing raises the value of minority interests) (emphasis added); accord Michael
Melvin & Magali Valero, The Dark Side ofInternational Cross-Listing: Effects on Rival Firms at Home,
15 EuR. FIN. MGMT. 66, 67 (2009); Reese & Weisbach, supra note 47, at 101-02.
53. Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities
Laws?, 75 J. FIN. EcoN. 319, 342 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
55. See, e.g., Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir.
1979).
56. See Siegel, supra note 53, at 342; id. at app. III (unpublished source data).
57. Natalya Shnitser, Note, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and
Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1685 (2010) ("In 1996, only 7.1% of
companies listed on U.S. exchanges were foreign, while 8.3% of federal filings targeted non-U.S.
issuers. By 2007, the percentage of foreign companies on U.S. exchanges had increased to 14.8% while
the percent of filings against non-U.S. issuers had reached 13.9%.").
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that list their shares on U.S. exchanges, this premium depends critically on
private enforcement of U.S. securities laws.58
The bonding hypothesis does not imply that in all cases, foreign firms
generate value for shareholders by subjecting themselves to private
enforcement of U.S. securities laws. Some foreign firms may choose to cross-
list their common stock on U.S. exchanges in order "to have access to the
capital available in the large and liquid American market," even if they would
prefer not to subject themselves to U.S. securities laws.59 This reality may be
especially true for firms whose home countries already have strong securities
laws, in which case the compliance costs resulting from duplicative regulatory
regimes may outweigh the investor-protection benefits. For this reason, several
securities law scholars have come to support an "issuer choice" regime, under
which foreign firms that cross-list shares on U.S. exchanges could opt into or
out of § 10(b) and the other elements of U.S. securities law.6 Foreign firms
that sought only the liquidity benefits of a U.S. listing would have that option,
whereas firms that wanted to bond themselves to U.S. securities laws could
choose to subject themselves to SEC disclosure requirements as well as public
and private enforcement actions.
II. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
Although the "issuer choice" commentary is primarily concerned with
allowing foreign firms to opt out of U.S. securities laws, recent events have
made it increasingly difficult for foreign firms to opt in. This difficulty arises
58. The "legal bonding" hypothesis discussed in the text is distinct from the "reputational
bonding" hypothesis presented by Jordan Siegel, among others. Cf Siegel, supra note 53, at 356
(discussing reputational bonding). The reputational bonding hypothesis holds that "investment bankers,
analysts, and active institutional shareholders play a certification role as 'reputational intermediaries' for
firms selling securities to the markets." G. Andrew Karolyi, Corporate Governance, Agency Problems
and International Cross-Listings: A Defense of the Bonding Hypothesis 7 (June 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). For instance, foreign firms from countries with weak shareholder
protections may choose prestigious investment banks to underwrite their U.S. cross-listings; these
underwriters may vouch for the quality of the cross-listed security and scrutinize the issuer carefully at
the public offering stage. See Gilberto Loureiro, The Reputation of Underwriters: A Test of the Bonding
Hypothesis, 16 J. COP. FIN. 516 (2010) (presenting empirical evidence consistent with this claim).
Investors in the United States and abroad may value this extra level of screening and may be willing to
pay more for shares of firms that have been "certified" by reputational intermediaries. This Comment
takes no position on whether "legal bonding" or "reputational bonding" provides a better explanation for
the observed cross-listing premium, and as Karolyi notes, the two versions of the bonding hypothesis
may be "complementary." See Karolyi, supra note 58, at 15-16, 19-20. My argument is simply that
foreign firms who want to engage in legal bonding through U.S. cross-listings should have the option to
do so.
59. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach ofSecurities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 919 (1998).
60. Id.; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2421 (1998); see Edmund W. Kitch, Proposals for Reform of
Securities Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 629 (2001).
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from the district courts' interpretation-or, as this Comment argues, their
misinterpretation-of the Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison.6 1
In Morrison, three Australian plaintiffs who purchased NAB common
stock on a Sydney exchange alleged that the bank had misled investors as to the
performance of NAB's U.S.-based mortgage servicing subsidiary.62 NAB's
common stock is not listed on any U.S. exchange, although NAB's sponsored
ADRs are traded on the NYSE. The Morrison majority held that § 10(b) did
not apply to the plaintiffs in the case because their complaint "involve[d] no
securities listed on a domestic exchange" and because "all aspects of the
purchases complained of . . . occurred outside the United States."6 Under
Morrison, sponsoring ADRs on a U.S. exchange does not bond a foreign firm
to the U.S. securities regime.
By the time Morrison reached the Supreme Court, the proposed plaintiff
class did not include investors who purchased NAB ADRs on the NYSE.ss
Thus, the Morrison majority did not decide whether domestic plaintiffs who
purchased ADRs on AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE could bring § 10(b) actions
against foreign firms. In the months since Morrison, several district courts have
indicated that Morrison does not preclude purchasers of ADRs from proceeding
with securities fraud suits against foreign firms.66 But as a practical matter, it
seems likely that class-action attorneys will shy away from securities fraud
suits against foreign firms if the potential plaintiff class is limited to ADR
purchasers because the potential payout would be limited to the damages
incurred by ADR purchasers. 6 7
The billion-dollar question is whether plaintiffs who purchased common
stock on a non-U.S. exchange can recover damages under § 10(b) if the
common stock is cross-listed for trading on a U.S. market. As mentioned
above, the Morrison majority seems to have answered this question
affirmatively, although district courts applying Morrison have reached the
61. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
62. Id. at 2875-76.
63. Id. at 2875.
64. Id. at 2888.
65. Id. at 2876 n.1.
66. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 05571, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17514, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011) ("The parties agree that Morrison has no impact on the
claims of ADR purchasers since Vivendi's ADRs were listed and traded on the NYSE."); Stackhouse v.
Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79837, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010)
(allowing the Maryland State Retirement and Pension System, which had suffered a large loss on
American Depository Shares of Toyota Motor Co., to proceed as lead plaintiff in a § 10(b) private
action). But see In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107719, at
*19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) ("[B]ecause '[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a "predominantly
foreign securities transaction,"' Section 10(b) is inapplicable." (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp.
2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010))).
67. Cf Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2004) ("[T]he level of client recovery is by
far the most important determinant of the attorney fee amount.").
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opposite result.68 The answer to this question will determine the force with
which § 10(b) bonds foreign firms. If the potential class can include all owners
of a foreign firm's common stock who suffer damages as a result of securities
fraud, regardless of whether the plaintiffs purchased their shares in the United
States or abroad, then private enforcement actions will be much more lucrative
and much more likely to be pursued. If investors who purchased their shares
abroad cannot join § 10(b) actions, then the tide of private actions against
foreign firms that cross-list their common stock may ebb.
III. (Mis)Interpreting Morrison
As of yet, this billion-dollar question has no clear answer. Three
competing interpretations have arisen. Under the first interpretation (the
"registered securities theory"), 70 § 10(b) applies to all transactions that are
registered on a U.S. exchange, regardless of where those transactions occur.
Under the second interpretation (the Southern District's approach), § 10(b) only
applies to transactions that occur inside the United States, regardless of where
the securities at issue are listed. Under the third interpretation (the "listed-for-
trading theory"), § 10(b) applies to transactions in securities that are listed for
trading on a U.S. exchange, even if the plaintiff purchased those securities
somewhere else. All three interpretations have their supporters. But only the
third interpretation is consistent with the Morrison majority's holding. And
only the third interpretation advances the objective of issuer choice.
A. The "Registered" Securities Theory
Plaintiffs' attorneys have argued that "Justice Scalia used 'registered' and
'listed' interchangeably" in his Morrison opinion and that § 10(b) therefore
applies to securities that are registered on a U.S. exchange, "[n]o matter
whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic, no matter where the transaction
occurred." 71 As mentioned above, many ADR sponsors also register their
68. See supra notes 13-15.
69. See Irwin H. Warren & Matthew E.K. Howatt, Transnational Securities Litigation in the
U.S. Courts After Morrison v. National Australia Bank: An "F-Cubed" Regression Analysis 21-22 (Oct.
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.weil.com/filesfPublication/362ff7fb-5049-
42e0-a731-a5d457ae7b62/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e83b53f9-93f0-4334-al64-
ada9832feb9b/Canadian%20Institute%2oMorrison%20Paper.pdf
70. Some commentators describe this first interpretation as the "listed securities theory." See,
e.g., George T. Conway, Postscript to 'Morrison v. National Australia Bank,'N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 2010, at
5, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202473318925; Warren & Platkov,
supra note 21. However, as discussed infra in Section III.C, the "registered securities theory" and the
"listed-for-trading theory" yield sharply contrasting conclusions in many cases, and lumping them
together in a single category obfuscates important distinctions between the two approaches.
71. See Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Vivendi Plaintiffs'Argument on the Impact of Morrison v.
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ordinary shares on U.S. exchanges, although the ordinary shares are not listed
for trading in the United States.72 Under the registered securities theory, a
foreign firm that sponsored an ADR program and registered the underlying
common stock with the SEC would thus enable all of its common stock holders
across the globe to sue in U.S. federal court under § 10(b). The problem with
this interpretation is that the NAB shares at issue in Morrison were in fact
registered-though not listed for trading-on the New York Stock Exchange.7 3
George Conway, the attorney who represented respondent NAB in Morrison
before the Supreme Court, has noted that if this registered securities theory
were right, "the Supreme Court got the result in National Australia wrong, and
the plaintiffs in National Australia should have been allowed to sue."74 In other
words, the registered securities theory interprets the Court's language in
Morrison in such a way as to contradict the Court's disposition of Morrison.
Not surprisingly, the Southern District has rejected the registered securities
theory.75
B. The Southern District's Doctrine
A second view, which Judge Marrero adopted in In re Alstom,
acknowledges that "isolated clauses of the [Morrison majority] opinion may be
read as requiring only that a security be 'listed' on a domestic exchange for its
purchase anywhere in the world to be cognizable under the federal securities
,,76laws. But instead of engaging with these clauses, the district court disregards
them. Instead, it points to a passage in which the Morrison majority opines that
"the focus of the Exchange Act is . . . upon purchases and sales of securities in
the United States."77 Since "§ 10(b)'s focus would not encompass purchases
and sales of covered securities that occur outside of the United States," then
according to this logic, § 10(b) does not apply to overseas transactions either.
argument-on-the-impact-of-morrison-v-national-australia-bank (posting a comment written by Michael
Spencer of the Milberg law firm).
72. See text accompanying supra notes 34-35.
73. See Supplemental Joint Appendix at 58, Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191), available at http://bit.ly/NABja (reproducing Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
Annual Report (Form 20-F) 1 (Nov. 16, 2000) (stating that NAB ordinary shares are "registered" on the
NYSE)).
74. Conway, supra note 70, at 5.
75. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6595, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98242, at *17-
18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) ("[T]he transactions themselves must occur on a domestic exchange to
trigger application of § 10(b) .... ); accord In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ.
300, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3974, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2011) (quoting and following In re
Alstom).
76. In re Alstom, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98242, at *17.
77. Id. at *17 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884).
78. Id.
79. The flaw in this logic is that many laws accomplish objectives that lie outside their
"focus." For instance, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") was initially
focused on the Mafia, see DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY To DESTROY MICHAEL
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While this view clashes with the text of the Morrison majority's opinion,
it has garnered some support among academics and practitioners. Richard
Painter, Douglas Dunham, and Ellen Quackenbos-who coauthored an amicus
brief supporting the respondents in Morrison -have made the bold claim that
Morrison is an example of a case in which "courts don't say what they
mean."8' According to Painter and his coauthors, "the Supreme Court did not
mean to extend the reach of Section 10(b) to foreign transactions in securities
'listed on an American exchange,"' even if the terms of the transactional test-
read at face value-may yield that conclusion. 82 Under this interpretation, the
real holding in Morrison is that § 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially,83 and
the Court's language about "securities listed on domestic exchanges" simply
shows that the Justices misunderstood the facts of the case. 84
The problem with this view, of course, is that "Justice Scalia usually
means what he says,"85 and the burden of persuasion should rest with the camp
that contends otherwise. Perhaps, if our only available options were the flawed
"registered securities theory" and the didn't-say-what-they-mean approach,
lower courts might reasonably disregard elements of the Morrison majority's
holding. But, there is a third way.
C. The Listed-for-Trading Theory
Rather than accepting the contention of the plaintiffs bar that "listed" is
synonymous with "registered," and rather than disregarding the test of the
Morrison majority opinion, a third option is to do what judges so often do when
faced with ambiguity: turn to the dictionary. Among all the Court's members,
MILKEN AND His FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 123 (1995), and yet the Court has allowed RICO to be used
against, for example, anti-abortion activists who sought to shut down women's health clinics, see Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994), as well as Croatian terrorists who tried to take
down the Yugoslav government, see United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 840 (1983). The "focus" of a law and the "reach" of the law are not necessarily coterminous.
80. Cf Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 31, Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) (listing Douglas Dunham and Ellen
Quackenbos as counsel); id. at app. (listing Richard Painter as lead amicus).
81. See Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress
Don't Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions ofthe Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011).
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. ("The Supreme Court's unequivocal holding is that Section 10(b) does not apply
'extraterritorially."'); cf Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2883 ("[T]here is no affirmative indication in the
Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.").
84. See Painter et al., supra note 81, at 10 (stating that the Supreme Court was "incorrect" in
its "statement that the transactions in Morrison did not involve stock listed on an American exchange");
cf Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 ("This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange. , . .").
Judge Holwell has also entertained the idea that "perhaps Justice Scalia simply made a mistake" in the
writing of Morrison. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 05571, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17514, at *48 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011).
85. See LaCroix, supra note 71 (quoting Spencer).
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"Justice Scalia has been the most willing to employ dictionaries,"8 and
although judicial resort to dictionary definitions typically occurs in the context
of statutory interpretation, 8 patent claim construction, trademark genericide
controversies, and contract disputes, 90 it seems especially appropriate to use
dictionaries to shed light on the textualist Justice Scalia's choice of words.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "listed security" as a "security accepted
for trading on a securities exchange."91 The New Oxford American Dictionary
defines "listed" as "admitted for trading on a stock exchange." 92 Other
lexicons 9 3 (and the SEC94) concur. If "listed" means "accepted for trading,"
then the outcome in Morrison matches the terms of the transactional test:
NAB's ordinary shares were never "listed" (that is, admitted for trading) on the
NYSE. According to this reading, § 10(b) would no longer apply to overseas
transactions involving ordinary shares of firms (for example, NAB) that only
list their ADRs-not their ordinary shares-for trading on U.S. exchanges. Yet,
§ 10(b) would still apply to the 445 non-U.S. companies whose ordinary shares
(rather than ADRs) that are directly listed for trading on AMEX, NASDAQ,
and NYSE.95 Appealingly, this interpretation does not necessitate the
intellectual acrobatics required by the registered securities theory and the
Southern District's doctrine.96
86. See Note, Looking It Up: The Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries in Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1439 n.14 (1994) (tabulating dictionary
references by each Justice over the 1988-1992 period and noting that Justice Scalia made reference to
dictionaries in twenty-three of his opinions over that span, while Justice O'Connor, the next most
dictionary-dependent Justice, referred to dictionaries on fifteen occasions).
87. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994).
88. See Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on
Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 181 (2003).
89. See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313
(2010).
90. See In re Envirodyne Indus., 29 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1994).
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (9th ed. 2009).
92. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1019 (3d ed. 2010).
93. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 766 (2d ed. 1997) (defining
listed as "admitted for trading privileges on a stock exchange"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 837 (4th ed. 1999) (stating that the verb "to list," in the context of "[f]inance," means: "to
admit (a stock, option, etc.) for trading on an exchange") (emphasis added). But cf MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 726 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "list" as "register").
94. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-1 (2011) ("The term listed means admitted to full trading
privileges. . .. ").
95. See supra notes 10-12.
96. Irving Warren and Margarita Platkov also argue that dictionaries can shed light on the
Morrison majority's holding, and they also conclude that the word "listed" implies "listed and traded."
See Warren & Platkov, supra note 21 (emphasis added). Warren and Platkov, however, do not follow
their argument to its logical conclusion. Instead, they write:
The common sense definitions of "listed" alone may not answer all of the questions that
Morrison has raised. For example, they may not answer questions as to a dual-listed and
traded stock, as addressed by Sgalambo v. McKenzie, where a Canadian issuer's common
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IV. Why Cross-Listing Common Stock Should Bond a Foreign Firm
There are three independent policy-related reasons why the courts ought
to adopt the listed-for-trading approach and apply § 10(b) to all transactions
involving the common stock of firms that directly cross-list their shares for
trading on a U.S. exchange, regardless of where that transaction takes place.
First, excluding all non-U.S. transactions from the scope of § 10(b)-even
when those transactions involve shares of firms whose common stock is also
listed for trading on a U.S. exchange-would frustrate the goals of the U.S.
regulatory regime. For example, federal courts allow private enforcement of
anti-insider trading laws by plaintiffs who "trad[ed] contemporaneously with
the insider." 97 The plaintiff does not have to show that she purchased a security
from (or sold a security to) the insider. As the Second Circuit has stated, "it
would make a mockery of the [insider trading regime] if we were to permit the
fortuitous matching of buy and sell orders to determine whether a duty to
disclose had been violated."98 Why, then, should we allow insiders to trade
cross-listed securities with impunity as long as they relegate their transactions
to foreign exchanges? The effect on U.S. markets would be the same as if they
had made the trades directly on AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. In other words,
if § 10(b) does not apply to overseas transactions involving common stock
listed on a U.S. exchange, then for those securities, § 10(b) may become a dead
letter, even with regard to transactions that do occur on a domestic exchange,
because potential violators have the opportunity to engage in cross-exchange
regulatory arbitrage.
Second, if investors who purchase a foreign firm's common stock on a
U.S. exchange retain the right to sue under § 10(b) while investors who buy the
foreign firm's common stock on an overseas exchange do not, then the effect of
Morrison is to create two classes of common stock where firms have chosen to
issue only one. Consider the case of UBS, the global investment bank
headquartered in Switzerland. 99 Common-equity interests in UBS trade as
stock (which was not listed so as to support an ADR program) was traded on both U.S. and
Canadian exchanges.
Id. (citing Sgalambo v. McKenzie, No. 09 Civ. 10087, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79688, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 6, 2010)). Yet, the authors never explain why their definition of "listed" does not resolve
Sgalambo, a case in which the securities at issue were Canadian Superior common stock that was listed
and traded on both AMEX and the Toronto Stock Exchange. See supra note 19. It would seem that if the
same securities were listed and traded on U.S. and Canadian exchanges, then the transactions on the
Canadian exchange involve[d] a security listed on a domestic [U.S.] exchange," see Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. at 2886, and the transactions therefore fall within § 10(b)'s ambit. Perhaps the more accurate
statement would be: the common sense definition of "listed" that Warren and Platkov endorse does
answer Sgalambo, but it does not yield the same answer that the Southern District reached.
97. See Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 1981).
98. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974).
99. UBS shares are the subject of an ongoing class action in the Southern District of New
York. Plaintiffs and defendants in that action have filed memoranda of law addressing the application of
Morrison to GRSs. See Lead Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition To UBS Defendants'
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Global Registered Shares ("GRSs")," which means that "the same share
purchased on the SIX Swiss Exchange can be sold on the New York Stock
Exchange or vice versa."10 A security is "not a discrete piece of solid
property" but a "bundle of rights."102 One of these rights (at least under U.S.
securities law) is the right to recover damages if the issuer violates § 10(b). If
UBS shareholders who purchase GRSs in New York have this right of recovery
while UBS shareholders who purchase GRSs in Switzerland do not, then the
total value of the bundle for the former class of shareholders is greater than the
total value of the bundle for the latter class. Simply by purchasing a UBS share
in Switzerland and reselling it in the United States, an arbitrageur adds a
valuable right to the bundle. In the short term, such an interpretation of § 10(b)
might favor the U.S. financial sector because the migration of GRSs from
foreign to domestic exchanges would yield fee income for U.S.-based brokers.
But in the long term, such an interpretation might frustrate the intentions of the
foreign firms that issue GRSs with the goal of creating a truly global market for
their shares. 103
Third, and most importantly, if § 10(b) does not apply to foreign
transactions involving shares of firms that cross-list their common stock for
trading on U.S. exchanges, then foreign firms will not be able to bond
themselves to U.S. securities laws effectively, even if they want to do so. After
Morrison, Dodd-Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act to enable SEC
enforcement of antifraud laws with regard to certain foreign securities
transactions.'0 But recall that the SEC takes enforcement action against cross-
Motion To Dismiss Claims Based on Purchases of UBS Shares Outside the United States, In re UBS AG
Sec. Litig., No. 1:07-CV- 1225 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Lead Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
UBS]; UBS Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion To Dismiss All Claims
Based on Purchases of JBS Shares Outside the United States, In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 1:07-CV-
11225 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010).
100. In addition to UBS, firms whose ordinary shares trade as GRSs include Daimler, see
Share Fact Sheet, DAIMLER, http://www.daimler.com/investor-relations/daimler-shares/share-fact-sheet
(last visited Feb. 10, 2011); Deutsche Bank, see Ordinary Share, DEUTSCHE BANK,
http://www.db.com/ir/en/content/ordinaryshare.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); and the chemicals
manufacturer Celanese, see CELANESE AG, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 52 (2002), available at
http://www.celanese.com/celgb_2001.pdf.
101. Frequently Asked Questions: UBS Share, UBS,
http://www.ubs.com/l/e/investors/faq/share.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
102. Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Ball Is Over: Investor Remedies in the Wake of the Dot-
Com Crash and Recent Corporate Scandals, 83 NEB. L. REv. 732, 738 (2005).
103. See G. Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, The First Truly Global Share, 9 J. CORP.
FIN. 409, 415 tbl. 1 (2003) (listing as an advantage of GRSs that "[a]ll shareholders have equal status,"
regardless of where they make their purchase); see also CELANESE AG, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
100, at 52 (stating that Celanese's decision to issue GRSs was "part of our commitment to provide all
shareholders with the same rights").
104. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa) (allowing the SEC to
bring actions "alleging ... violation[s] of the antifraud provisions of this title involving . . . conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States," as well as "conduct occurring outside the United
States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States").
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listed firms only infrequently. 05 Unless cross-listing makes a foreign firm
liable to a broad class of private plaintiffs, then bonding is an empty gesture
rather than a credible commitment to abide by U.S. law.
Fortuitously, if federal courts hold that § 10(b) applies to foreign
transactions involving shares of firms that cross-list their common stock for
trading on U.S. exchanges, then the courts will have created a de facto issuer
choice regime. ADRs will offer access to U.S. capital markets without
significant civil liability. Direct listing will enable foreign firms to bond
themselves to the U.S. system of public and private antifraud enforcement.
Firms that value the liquidity of U.S. stock exchanges-but not the legal
liability associated with § 10(b)-can choose to sponsor ADRs. Meanwhile,
firms that want to commit to stronger investor protections can take the direct-
listing route.
Admittedly, since pre-Morrison case law did not establish a clear
distinction between directly cross-listed ordinary shares, on the one hand, and
ADRs, on the other, o0 some firms that sponsored ADRs with the intention of
bonding themselves to U.S. securities laws might have to go through the
process of cancelling their ADR programs and listing their ordinary shares
directly on a U.S. exchange. However, this process is not unduly arduous. For
example, UBS terminated its ADR program in preparation for its GRS offering
in 2000; 107 ADR sponsors that wanted to bond themselves to U.S. securities
laws in the post-Morrison world could follow the same procedures. Although
the distinction between ADR and common stock does not necessarily track past
expectations, it does allow for an issuer choice regime on U.S. exchanges going
forward.
Conclusion
In sum, this Comment has argued that foreign firms should be able to opt
in to the U.S. securities regime by cross-listing their common stock for trading
on a U.S. exchange. Interpreted in this light, Morrison marks a step toward an
issuer choice regime. The Morrison majority's transactional test allows firms to
(a) bond themselves to U.S. securities laws by cross-listing common stock for
trading or (b) gain the liquidity advantages of U.S. capital markets without
legal liability under § 10(b) by sponsoring ADRs.
So far, the Southern District has read Morrison to preclude all claims
arising from transactions that occur on foreign markets-even when those
transactions involve common stock that is cross-listed for trading on a U.S.
exchange. To the extent that legal bonding has allowed foreign firms to
105. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 43.
107. See Lead Plaintiffs' Memorandum, UBS, supra note 99 at 7-9.
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generate shareholder value through cross-listings over the last several decades,
this interpretation of Morrison threatens to erase that value.
The Southern District's interpretation may produce short-term gains for
foreign firms that find themselves as defendants in § 10(b) class actions, since
potential plaintiff classes (and thus potential payouts) will be significantly
smaller. But over the long term, the Southern District's interpretation of
Morrison may make it more difficult for foreign firms to lower their capital
costs through cross-listing, in which case the firms themselves, their
shareholders, and the U.S. financial sector will be worse off.
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